Let’s rebuild Nginx with CVE-2026-9256 patch according to the Debian-way.

A critical vulnerability in nginx allows remote code execution with the privileges of the nginx worker process by sending a specially crafted HTTP request.
But that’s not the point.
The problem is that Debian maintainers are in no hurry to release a new patch package.

• Security Bug Tracker CVE-2026-9256
• NGINX ngx_http_rewrite_module vulnerability CVE-2026-9256

apt --no-install-recommends \
    --no-install-suggests install \
    build-essential \
    fakeroot \
    devscripts

nano /etc/apt/sources.list

# trixie sources
deb-src https://deb.debian.org/debian/ trixie main contrib non-free non-free-firmware
deb-src http://security.debian.org/debian-security/ trixie-security main contrib non-free non-free-firmware
deb-src https://deb.debian.org/debian/ trixie-updates main contrib non-free non-free-firmware

Introduction from afar

Not long ago I felt nostalgic inside FreeBSD again, everything is wonderful, everything is familiar, everything is convenient.
There is just one point that completely rules it out from desktop use, at least for me.
On almost all my laptops, FreeBSD does not support either sleep or standby modes (s2disk/s2ram).
And I couldn’t do anything with the hardware/drivers/ACPI, but I tried a lot.

Without standby mode, it is completely impossible to use a laptop, since after transportation, you need to load everything again, turn it on, and restore a complex work session.
And I only reboot workstations after applying updates that require it.

One of the many nice little things that Beastie has that Debian lacks is ZFS Boot Environments, this is somewhat more convenient than, say, LVM snapshots.
And the second is GEOM_ELI, which supports not only, like LUKS, the OR password OR key mode, but also supports password WITH key mode.

I thought and thought, and decided to deploy Debian from scratch, taking into account all the tools I use, my experience, and, importantly, my habits.

Debian is still my main system, so the only way to get a hardware (physical) encryption key in addition to the password is to make it from the header and place it on a bootable USB flash drive.

Very, very often you have to deal with the need to use a certain version of Python, for example, for torch, or for something specific.
Using conda or Docker with nvidia-container-toolkit and then setting up images like nvidia/cuda:13.0.1-runtime-ubuntu22.04 feels counterintuitive to me, even though I’ve done it many times.
And an additional packages have to be installed in the container.

But easier and more convenient to compile everything on the host system, and at the same time prevent contamination of the entire system with third-party libraries and executable files.

The following is an example of building multiple Python versions for the verpy group only, which is a bit more convenient than installing for just one user.

• ai - an arbitrary user from whom the compilation is performed.
• verpy - the group that will be allowed to use these versions.

apt install \
    build-essential libssl-dev zlib1g-dev libbz2-dev libreadline-dev libsqlite3-dev \
    wget curl llvm libncurses5-dev libncursesw5-dev xz-utils tk-dev libffi-dev \
    liblzma-dev libgdbm-dev libnsl-dev libgdbm-compat-dev

mkdir /opt/openssl
mkdir /opt/python
groupadd --gid 42398 verpy
usermod -aG verpy ai

This example shows an installation over LXC, while for any more or less serious use this is completely unacceptable and requires using KVM with additional security measures.
And besides, installation on KVM will be much, much easier.
LXC does not provide adequate security because, for proper operation, it requires mounting the /sys and /proc partitions from the host, which are accessible to all LXC instances.
Furthermore, this example requires using a PRIVILEGED virtual machine.
However, LXC allows relatively easy setting up a testing infrastructure without the overhead associated with KVM.
So some aspects in this example will only be related to the setup in LXC.

On the HOST system

First, let’s make preparations on the host system.

nano /etc/modules

overlay
nf_nat
br_netfilter
xt_conntrack
rbd
fuse
ip_vs
ip_vs_rr
ip_vs_wrr
ip_vs_sh
iptable_nat

nano /etc/sysctl.d/35-lxc-kubernetes.conf

kernel.dmesg_restrict = 0
net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1
net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding = 1
net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-iptables = 1
# --conntrack-max-per-core Default: 32768 * N
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max=131072
# net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-arptables
# kernel.pid_max=100000
# user.max_user_namespaces=15000
vm.compact_memory = 1
vm.overcommit_memory = 1

Everyone knows about the limits on the number of connections from one IP (IP-based), but what if we want to limit the number of connections to a certain API per authorization token?
And it doesn’t matter how many different IPs will be used.

Part of the nginx config:

map $request_uri $client_token {
    "~*(?i)(token=)([a-f0-9]{32})" $2;      # regex return <32str>
    default                        "";      # Fallback to limit_req_zone:global
}

limit_req_zone  $binary_remote_addr   zone=global:32m       rate=100r/s;    # Rule_1
limit_req_zone  $client_token         zone=tokenlimit:32m   rate=5r/s;      # Rule_2
limit_req       zone=global           burst=25;

server {
        location / {
            index index.html;
            root /var/www/html;
        }
        location = /api {
            index index.html;
            root /var/www/api/html;
            limit_req   zone=tokenlimit   burst=5 nodelay;  # api location
            limit_req   zone=global;                        # Fallback
            limit_req_status              429;              # 503